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IN THE SUPID.NE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--------------------------------------
UTAH FARM PRODUCTION 
CREDIT ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
COX, JEFFREY J. AND ELLIOTT J. 
a co-partnership, ELLIOTT J. 
COX, JEFFREY J. COX, YVONNE 
COX, BLANCHE COX, UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICAN, ~CY-COLLINS BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, BANK OF 
EPHRAIM, 
Defendant-Respondents. 
Case No. 7588 
--------------------------------------
BREIF IN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
THE PE'l'ITION FOR REHEARING IS UNTIMELY 
Rule 76 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the 
petition for rehearing must be within 20 days after the filing of the 
decision. The decision was filed March 9, 1981. The petition for rehearing 
was filed March 30, 1981. Even if the day of March 9th is not counted in 
computing the 20 days, the 29th of March was the last day for the petition 
for rehearing. Therefore, the Court does not have jurisdiction. 
THE POINTS RAISED IN THE PErITION HAVE BEEN 
FULLY CONSIDERED PREVIOUSLY 
As is stated in the Appellant Advocacy Handbook of the Utah Supreme 
~' a petition for rehearing will not be granted where the points raised 
in the petition have been fully considered in the original hearing. People 
v. ~og~r,son, 7 P.410 (Utah 1885); Brown v. Pickard, 11 P.512 (Utah 1886); Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Techn logy Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-2-
Ducherau v. House, 11P.618 (Utah 1886); Jones v. House. 11P.619 (Utah 1896). 
The issue of mitigation and the agrument now being made by the 
petitioner was ful1y considered in the original hearing and should not be 
considered again. 
THERE WAS NO MITIGATION AS REQUIRED BY LAW 
Where there has been a breach of a loan commitment, the borrower must 
make a reasonable attempt to obtain the money elsewhere. Cox Corporation v. 
Dugger, 583 P.2d 96 (Utah 1978), 36 A.L.R. 1416; 22 Am Jur 2d §69 Damages; 
Restatement, Contracts §343 (1932); 5 A. Corbin, Contracts §1078, at 446 
(1964); Davis v. Small Business Inv. Co. of Houston. 535 SW2d 740 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1976). Special damages, such as lost profits, are only recoverable where 
the borrower is unable to obtain the money elsewhere. Cox Corporation v. 
Dugger, supra. 
There is good reason why the mitigation must take the form of an 
attempt to obtain an alternate source of financing. That is because the 
alternate loan eliminates all special damages, such as lost profits, and 
reduces the damages to the difference in interest rates. Ordinarily there is 
no difference in interest rates and therefore damages cannot be more than 
nominal because the money may usually be procured elsewhere at the same rate. 
36 A.L.R. 1409; 22 Am Jur 2d §69, Damages; Bank of New Mexico v. Rice, 429 P.2d 
368 (N.M. 1967); Investment Service Company v. Smither, 556 P.2d 955 (Ore. 
1967); Consolidated American Life Ins. Co. v. Covington, 297 So. 2d 894 (Miss. 
1974). 
The Petitioner would have the Court approve of an alternate form of 
mitigation which would have only reduced the damages by approximately $4,000.00 
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(20,COO poults sold at 20¢. each) compared to the $44,000 that could have been 
saved through alternate financing (assuming that any profit would have been 
ma.de). Furthermore, the sale of the 20 ,COO turkeys was not done for the 
benefit of Utah Farm Production Credit Association (hereafter PCA), but solely 
for the benefit of the petitioner. PCA was not even credited with the money 
recieved by the petitioner from the sale. So the sale was not any form of 
mitigation. The only reasonable attempt at mitigation would have been to obtain 
alternate financing even if there was a risk that the turkeys could die in the 
meantime. It is unlikJy the turkeys would have died because the petitioner had 
received a short term loan from the Bank of Ephriam to solve a similar problem 
and certainly that could have been done again. At least the petitioner is 
required to have made an attempt. 
The petitioner would have the Court believe that canceling the order 
for 40,000 turkeys was an extraordinary effort by the petitioner to mitigate 
damages. Such is not the case. It is not even reasonably certain that 
petitioner would have been able to purchase the last 40, OCO poul ts. Whether 
the order for 40,CXJO poults would have been accepted would have been at the 
option of the Board of Directors of the selling company. (Transcript 176-177) 
The manager of the selling company testified that petitioner would have been a 
second priority customer on its order because they were not paying cash. 
The argument that the petitioner had no collateral to offer as 
security to another lender is without merit because the loan could have been 
one that refinanced the delinquent loan with PCA thereby making the.collateral 
available. Such had been done in the pa.st. (Transcript 137) This would have 
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given the petitioner a place to grow the turkeys because there would have 
been no foreclosure. So it is not a situation where PCA is taking 
advantage of a situation it created. Rather it is a situation where the 
petitioner has created his own problems by getting delinquent on the prior 
loan and in a position where there could be a foreclosure. 
There is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that 
the petitioner gave up the opportunity to sell his farm and dividends at a 
beneficial price. The answers to interrogatories stated that there was no 
buyer that was obligated to make any purchase. 
The borrowers had plenty of time to obtain alternate financing. 
Even if that had failed, all the borrowers had to do to get the loan from PCA 
was pledge the stock of Elliott Cox, one of the respondents, in the Moroni 
Coal Company. (Transcript 102-103) That would have created no burden 
because Elliott Cox was already personally liable on the note and thus his 
stock was already indirectly pledged. (Transcript 288) Consequently, it 
would have been reasonable for the borrowers to have pledged the stock. 
Having failed to do so and more particularly having failed to obtain 
alternate financing, the damages must be denied as a matter of law. 
The entire argument of the petitioner ignores one other important 
factor. Rather than get another loan, petitioner went to work with the 
Moroni Coal Company. That resulted in profits to that Company and he was a 
46-47% shareholder. The profits were reinvested in the Company. The 
appellant was not credite~ with that benefit to the petitioner, but only 
with petitioner's salary. Even if PCA was given credit for the profit 
and even if it was not enough to cover all the petitioner's alleged damages, 
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petitioner would still not get the difference in damages because the 
mititation must, as a matter of law, be in the form of an attempt to get 
another loan before special damages are recoverable. Furthermore, for all we 
know, the profit to Moroni Coal Company was more than the damages claimed by 
the petitioner for the alleged breach of loan agreement. (Transcript 
139-142) Petitioner wants the profits from two busineses for the same year 
when he could not have been two places at once. 
THERE ARE OTHER REASONS WHY THE DECISION OF THE 
TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REVERSED 
Even if the Court were to rehear the argument regarding 
mitigation, the case should still_ have been reversed because: 
1. The loan officer who allegedly authorized the loan had no 
authority. 
2. The damages for lost profit were not within the contemplation 
·of the parties at the time of the contract as required by law. 
3. The alleged loan agreement was not in writing as required by the 
Statute of Frauds. 
4. The petitioner failed to prove that he was an average turkey 
grower or that he ran his business in a way that was comparable to the other 
growers or that his facility was in any way comparable. Therefore, there is 
a crucial missing link in the chain of evidence. In other words, there is no 
connection between the fact that other growers earned a certain profit and 
that therefore the petitioner would have earned such profit. 
5. There was no prior history of successful operation. Again, as 
a matter of law, this makes the damage award too speculative. 
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In addition to the above reasons for total reversal, there are 
other reasons why the trial court erro~ed as follows: 
1. Since it is not reasonably certain that the petitioner could 
have taken delivery of the last 40,(XX) poults, two-thirds (2/3) of the 
counterclaim award is speculative. 
2. Since it is speculative as to whether the dividend will be 
available in 1982, the sum of $28,940.40, representing the dividend portion 
of the counterclaim award, is speculative. 
3. Since not all of the expenses were deducted from the claimed 
profits, the amount of the counterclaim is incorrect and this would require 
its dismissal entirely because the petitioner has failed to meet his burden 
of proof. 
4. The award must be reduced $4, 000. 00 because pre judgment 
interest is improper because it cannot be awarded on a unliquidated amount 
and beca:use there was no evidence to support the amount calculated by the 
trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court has no juridiction over this case because the petition 
for rehearing was untimely. Even if there is jurisdiction there is nothing 
new in the petition for rehearing and therefore the matter cannot be 
reconsidered. 
For good reason the law requires mitigation to be in the form of an 
attempt to obtain alternate financing. This is because that will ordinarily 
eliminate all damages. The claimed mitigation of the petitioner would only 
have eliminated a fraction of the claimed damages and was not even done for 
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the benefit of PCA. The petitioner wants the money from the sale of the 
turkeys and the benefits to the Moroni Coal Company without crediting PCA 
with anything. That is what they call mitigation. 
There are many other good reasons why the lower court ruling should 
be reversed. Even if the mitigation argument of the petitioner had any 
merit, it would not change the result of the case. 
Respectf11l l.y Submitted 
0Q_~L t3.,3c.J~ 
David B. Boyce ) 
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